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Abstract 
 
Through out the Western countries welfare policies and in particular labour market 
policies changes quit dramatically. This is also the case in the Nordic countries, especially 
in Denmark, even though neo-liberal workfare strategies never have been an option. The 
aim of this article is to analyse the public attitudes connected to these changes in 
Scandinavia. Do the general public pity the unemployed? Do the unemployed pity 
themselves? Are the policy makers blamed or blessed? Based on comparative surveys from 
Finland and Denmark including both a population sample and a large sub-sample of 
unemployed the paper shows that in the case of activation both the general public but also 
the unemployed themselves perceive the intensified ‘active’ policy as a plus-sum game. In 
terms of increased control the unemployed is more sceptic whereas the public to a very 
large extend is in favour – especially in Finland. Thus, the political scene seems much 
more set for ‘credit claming’ than ‘blame avoidance’. However, this cannot be seen as a 
road to a real workfare strategy. The country difference between Finland and Denmark 
and survey results based on Danish election data indicate that public support for ‘harsher’ 
labour market policy actually can be mitigated. And when it comes to lowering benefits the 
electorate in all the Nordic countries is remarkable conservative. 
 
Key words: Workfare, activation, public attitude, blame avoidance, unemployed. 
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Introduction 
 
Throughout the Western countries most welfare states have been under fiscal pressure 
during the last two decades. It has forced policy makers to reduce costs, restructure or even 
retrench a number of core welfare arrangements. In the wake of these fiscal problems a 
growing literature on the political dynamic of welfare state retrenchment has emerged. 
Pierson, being one of the pioneers (Pierson, 1993, 1996 and 2001), has argued that 
retrenchment is a political exercise in blame-avoidance. Retrenchment means taking 
something away from someone, and those suffering these (concentrated) looses are likely 
to react negatively. Furthermore, a body of survey studies consistently show that the 
welfare state is popular with the electorate in general (e.g. Papakis & Bean, 1993; 
Svallfors, 1997) i.e. not only the ‘losers’ but also the general public are likely to react 
negatively to retrenchment. Thus, according to this literature the tension between necessary 
reforms pursued by the policy elite and a reluctant constituency form a major conflict line 
in modern politics. The literature often use the label ‘the new politics’ of the welfare state 
in contrast to ‘the old politics’ of the 1960s and 1970s, where politicians fought about 
getting credit for the pursued policy. Taken this prevailing theory as a point of departure 
our task is to analyse the interplay between the changed labour market policy and public 
opinion in Denmark and Finland during the 1990s. 
 
By focusing on labour market policy we enter one of the most tense policy discussions 
within ‘the new politics of the welfare state’. At one hand because increasing 
unemployment is at the heart of the experienced fiscal problems and at the other hand 
because policy makers have seen changed labour market policy as a possibility to 
overcome some of the fundamental problems that face present welfare states. Using the 
language of policy makers themselves the changes can be characterised as a shift from 
‘passive’ to ‘active’ labour market policy aimed at re-integration of the unemployed into 
the labour market. Other use such terms as a shift from ‘old-style’ policy to ‘new-style 
policy’ or ‘third way policy’. Especially the latter term implies that these new policies are 
created to overcome the experienced trade-off between employment and equality (as 
argued e.g. by OECD, 1994, Iversen & Wren, 1998; Esping-Andersen, 1996). 
 
In contrast, critics see the changed labour market policy as one of the most profound attack 
on social rights. Using their language the changes are often summarised as a shift from 
‘welfare’ to ‘workfare’. In a European context it refers to a harsh shift from previous 
‘welfare’ policies aimed at ‘de-commodifying’ the citizens from the market (Esping-
Andersen, 1990), to new ‘workfare’ policies that recommodify labour by reductions in 
social benefits, tighter eligibility criteria and control. 
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Whether policy makers or their critics are right are not for us to decide.  
Our main interest is by means of survey data to analyse how the general public and the 
unemployed themselves perceive the changed labour market policy in the Nordic countries. 
By doing so we adopt the framework of blame-avoidance to a field where we from the 
literature on deservingness criteria have theoretical arguments for the counter thesis; 
namely that the public actually would be in favour of harsher policy. Therefore we need to 
open the ‘black box’ of voter attitude as we, also at a more general level, find it 
problematic simply to perceive the constituency as a veto-point that react negatively to any 
change of welfare state policy. 
 
The article is organised into five sections. The first section gives a brief overview of 
Nordic unemployment experience and the harsher labour market policy pursued especially 
in Denmark and Finland during the 1990s. The second section asks the simple question 
whether the public, but also the unemployed themselves, thinks there are anything to blame 
politicians. If policy makers manage to ‘sell’ the changed labour market policy as a plus-
sum game we should expect the negative reactions to be modest. The third section analyses 
the attitudes to further control with unemployed and the fourth section analyses attitudes to 
reductions in the level of benefits. The fifth section summarises the empirical findings.  
 
Unemployment and harsher labour market policy in the Nordic countries 
 
In a Nordic context the harsh neo-liberal workfare policies have never been an option and 
until the beginning of the 1990s Sweden, Norway and to some extent Finland actually 
managed to balance low unemployment and highly developed social protection. The 
Danish welfare state was as developed but already during the 1980s did Danes experience 
unemployment levels above 8 per cent (OECD standardised unemployment rates standard, 
see figure 1). However, in the beginning of the 1990’s also Swedes and Fins experienced 
economic crises that generated unemployment levels at respectively 9.4 and 16.7 per cent 
in 1994. The Danish unemployment rate peaked at a level of 9.6 per cent in 1993, whereas 
Norway due to oil resources managed to avoid severe economic crisis.  
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Figure 1: OECD standardised unemployment rates in Scandinavian from 1980 to 2002. 
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Note: OECD do not have standardised unemployment figures on Denmark from 1980-1987. Instead we have 
used the common national definition subtracted two per cent points, as this is approximately the difference 
between the national definition and OECD standardised during the 1990s.  
 
 
The primary Swedish and Finish policy response was a so-called cost containment policy 
(Pierson, 2001:423). In Sweden unemployment benefits were lowered from 90 to 80 per 
cent of previous earnings i 1993 (temporarily to 75 per cent in 1996-97), but the 
programmatic structure of the unemployment system remained largely intact. In Finland 
the replacement rates were reduced in 1992 and again in 1994 but the cost containment 
policy was also followed by stricter requirements as to participation in activation 
programmes and re-qualification for benefits (Furåker, 2002; Clasen, Kvist & van 
Oorschot, 2001; Ervasti, 2002). More radical reforms were decided in Denmark as the long 
period with high unemployment created the perception among policy makers that 
‘something radical needs to be done’ (Albrekt Larsen, 2002) and declining unemployment 
in the second half of the 1990s (see figure 1) reduced the social costs of harsher policy. 
Thus, during the second half of the 1990s duration of the unemployment period was 
reduced from around 9 to 4 years (of which three years in almost permanent activation), 
eligibility criteria, activation and work requirements were tightened and for some minor 
groups maximum benefits were reduced (Goul Andersen, 2002b; Albrekt Larsen & Goul 
Andersen, 2003). 
 
In order to describe public attitude to these changes we primarily make use of a 
comparative Nordic data set collected in 1999 but unfortunately the questions of our 
present interest was only asked in Denmark and Finland.1 Fortunately Denmark and 
Finland are the most interesting cases as policy shift has been most severe in these two 
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countries. Harsher policy has been discussed in Norway but not much has been carried 
through (Halvorsen, 2002) and Sweden has always had a harsh policy when it comes to 
duty to work. Furthermore, we still find an interesting country difference in unemployment 
experience as Finland to a much larger extent than Denmark experienced an exogenous 
economic shock (deep recession in both neighbour economises i.e. Sweden and the former 
Soviet union). And at time of interview in 1999 the unemployment level was more than 
twice as high in Finland (10.2) as in Denmark (4.8), see figure 1.   
 
Is there anything to blame? 
 
One can start by asking the simple question whether the public actually think 
unemployment policy has become harsher in the Nordic countries. It is difficult for 
politicians to hide the fact that reductions in the level of benefits as undertaken in Denmark 
from 1982 to 1985 and in Sweden and Finland during the 1990s worsened the situation of 
unemployed. Just following the political discourse it is clear that the main reference for the 
policy elite was necessity. The sudden economic crisis in the 1990s in Sweden and Finland 
made such a reference to necessity credible i.e. immediate cost reduction in order to meet 
the immediate economic problems of the welfare state. In Denmark it was the long-term 
balance of payments problems and not a sudden economic shock that made cost 
containment policy of the bourgeois government during the 1980s credible (Peterson et al, 
1989). 
 
However, when it comes to reduction in the unemployment period and tightened eligibility 
criteria, activation and work requirements the responsible politicians have presented the 
policy as a two-edged sword where by new obligations are followed by new rights. E.g. 
unemployed are obliged to work for their money in different activation schemes but at the 
same time they have a right to ‘work’. To put it in other words the elements of ‘stick’ is 
compensated by new ‘carrots’. The question is whether this argument is ‘bought’ by the 
public. 
 
The survey material from Denmark and Finland give us possibility both to describe the 
perception of the population (18-68 years) and the perception of the long term unemployed 
(the unemployed were taken from registers in such a way that they as a minimum had 
experienced 6 months of previous unemployment). Both groups were asked the following 
question; ‘During the last years a lot has been done to get unemployed back to the labour 
market, activated or educated as soon as possible after they have become unemployed. Do 
you believe this is an advantage for the unemployed- or is it a disadvantage?’ The basic 
frequencies are shown in table 1.  
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Table 1: Perception of new labour market policy being an advantage or disadvantage for 
unemployed. 
  Denmark Finland 
  Advan-
tage 
Mostly 
advan-
tage 
Mostly 
disad-
vantage 
Disad-
vantage 
N (not 
weigh-
ted) 
Advan-
tage 
Mostly 
advan-
tage 
Mostly 
disad-
vantage 
Disad-
vantage 
N (not 
weigh-
ted) 
Population 
(18-66 years) 
50 40 6 3 3512 51 44 3 2 1678 
Employed  48 39 8 5 1328 52 44 3 2 1096 
Long term 
unemployed  
42 38 13 8 376 35 52. 8 5 827 
 Non-insured 44 39 11 7 46 42 49 6 4 287 
 
 
As Measured by this indicator it becomes clear that the public do not perceive the changed 
labour market policy in Finland and Denmark as a workfare reform. In Denmark 90 per 
cent of the population (18-66 years) indicate that the increased effort to find job, activate or 
educate is an advantage or mostly an advantage for unemployed. In Finland the 
corresponding figure is 95 per cent. Only 10 per cent in Denmark and 5 per cent in Finland 
perceive the effort as a disadvantage for unemployed. These figures are naturally 
influenced by the positive framing of the question e.g. ‘get unemployed back to labour 
market’ whereas harsher obligations are not mentioned. Asked directly about e.g. increased 
mobility obligations or reduction of benefits the picture would be more negative (as we 
shall see in the fourth section). However, it is interesting that not even the long-term 
unemployed themselves find the new policies to be a disadvantage. Even though the share 
that indicates disadvantage has increased to 21 per cent in Denmark and 13 per cent in 
Finland an overwhelming majority of the unemployed perceive the effort as an advantage. 
Even if we only look at non-insured – to whom policy reforms seem particularly harsh – do 
we only find modest differences. Another target group is the young. But not even among 
Danish unemployed below 25 years (who were exposed to so-called immediate activation 
and those without any formal education lost half of their unemployment benefit) do we 
find mentionable resistance towards the policy. Only 19 per cent sees it as a disadvantage. 
 
Thus, even though some scholars argue that fundamental changes in direction of re-
commodification have taken place – at least in Denmark – this is not the perception of the 
population or the unemployed themselves. Nor do we find any strong political polarisation 
on the subject. In Denmark the most critical group is voters of the left-wing party 
‘Enhedslisten’ which political leaders repeatedly has argued against the new ‘active’ 
policies. Still only 15 per cent of their voters perceive the changed policy as a disadvantage 
for unemployed. In Finland the voters of the left wing party is also more sceptical (12 per 
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cent indicate disadvantage) than the Social Democrats (3 per cent indicate disadvantage) 
but actually it is the Christian Democrats that is most sceptical (12 per cent indicate 
disadvantage). Thus, the overall conclusion is that the intensified ‘active’ labour market 
policy in the Nordic countries much more set the scene for political credit claming than 
blame-avoidance. 
 
This might reflect that policy is fairly ‘soft’ by international standards (Lødemel, 2000) 
(especially if one look at the actual implemented policy), but it might also reflect the 
almost hegemonic ‘active discourse’ that emphasis new policies as a plus-sum game. As 
long as we deal with education and activation this plus-sum idea actually seem rather 
convincing. However, the reforms also contain a number of harsher elements in terms of 
access to benefits, control and in some cases reduction of benefits. Therefore we want to 
explore the limits of the apparent consensus, even between unemployed and the employed. 
In the next two sections we respectively discuss the issue of control and the issue of 
reduced benefits.  
 
Deservingness criteria, ‘active’ rhetoric and public attitude to increased control 
 
There are good theoretical reasons to believe that the public rather than blaming politicians 
for harsher policy will be willing to support harsher policy towards unemployed. It is a 
well-know fact that the high public support for the welfare state found throughout the 
western world and especially in the Nordic countries (e.g. measured on such questions as 
‘support for maintaining social reforms’; Goul Andersen et. al., 1999) becomes much more 
conditional when the public is asked about individual programs. Coughlin found what he 
called a universal dimension of support as the public in all the examined countries seemed 
to be most in favour of support for old people, followed by support for sick, disabled, 
needy families with children and least in favour of support to unemployed and people on 
social assistance (Couglin, 1980, see also Petterson, 1995). Previous studies on 
deservingness criteria (Cook, 1979; De Swann, 1988; Will, 1993; van Oorschot, 2000) 
show that especially the issue of control is important. The crucial feature in order to 
explain modest support for unemployed is the perception that they are much more in 
control of their situation than e.g. disabled, sick and pensioners. A Swedish Study from 
2000 e.g. showed that 73 percent agreed that ‘many of those who receive unemployment 
benefits would be able to get a job if they just wanted to’ (Furåker & Blomsterberg 
2003:197). Following this line of reasoning we should in general expect the public to be in 
favour of harsh labour market policy. 
 
Furthermore, one could suggest that the stronger emphasis on supply side problems might 
enhance the perception of unemployed being in control/responsible. Within the old 
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Keynesian paradigm it was difficult to blame the unemployed because the crucial 
(perceived) problem was lack of aggregated demand. I.e. the policy discussions among 
experts and politicians spread by the mass media would focus on how to stimulate demand 
for labour power. Within the paradigm of Monetarism the policy discussion is centred on 
the supply side and how to solve e.g. incentive problems, geographic mobility, professional 
mobility, reservations wages etc. All these parameters involve the motivation of those 
unemployed - an implicit accusation that job search is insufficient because people prefer 
not to work. If such supply-side policy discussion can increase the public perception of 
unemployed being in control of their situation we should expect (other things being equal) 
Danes to be more in favour of harsh policy than Fines. We assume that the supply-side 
explanations has been more influential in Denmark than in Finland primarily because it 
was obviously that the Finish economic in the 1990s was hid by a sudden exogenous shock 
due to break down of the Soviet Union and Swedes economy. 
 
When it comes to the issue of control Danes and Finns were asked whether control with the 
labour market availability of the unemployed should be tightened or loosened (see table 2). 
The results support the conclusion that according to public opinion there is not much to 
blame politicians. Only 9 per cent of the Danish population and 4 per cent of the Finish 
population think that control with the availability of the unemployed should be loosened 
(measured in 1999). On the contrary a large group in both Denmark and Finland would like 
to see tighter control i.e. again the political scene is more set for credit claming than blame 
avoidance. 
 
However, we find a large difference between the two countries. In Finland a majority of 69 
per cent would like to see tighter control, whereas the corresponding figure is 45 per cent 
in Denmark. Taken the differences in business cycle into account the difference is actually 
rather remarkable. In Denmark the unemployment level was at a modest 4.8 per cent i.e. 
jobs seemed available which increase the rationality of further control and reduce the 
social costs connected to harsher policy. In contrast Finland still experienced a rather high 
unemployment level at 10.2 per cent i.e. if one or two unemployed were not available it 
probably did not make a difference and due to lack of job the social cost of harsher policy 
would be severe.  
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Table 2: Public attitude towards tighter or looser control with the labour market 
availability of unemployed. 1999. Percentage 
  Denmark Finland 
  Control 
should be 
tightened 
As it is 
now 
Control 
should 
be 
loose-
ned 
 N (not 
weighted) 
Control should 
be tightened 
As it is 
now 
Control 
should be 
loosened 
 N (not 
weighted) 
Population 
(18-66 years) 
45 46 9  3426 69 27 4  1543 
Employed  42 47 11  1336 73 24 3  1027 
Long term 
unemployed  
18 59 23  458 33 55 12  713 
 Non-insured 16 57 28  76 38 54 8  252 
‘Don’t know excluded. 
 
When we turn to the attitudes of subgroups it becomes clear that the consensus shown in 
table 1 between the population/the employed and unemployed on the intensified ‘active’ 
policy is not found on the control issue. This is not to say that the unemployed are in pity 
of themselves. On the contrary, only 12 per cent of Finish unemployed and 23 per cent of 
Danish unemployed think that control should be loosened i.e. not even a majority among 
unemployed think politicians should be blamed for too tight control. What distinguish the 
groups are the preferences for tighter control. Among Danish unemployed only 18 per cent 
are in favour of the former compared to 45 per cent in the population. In Finland the share 
is 38 per cent compared to 69 per cent. Thus, in contrast to the population/employed a 
majority of unemployed in both countries think that control should be maintained at the 
present level. But the difference between Finland and Denmark can also be found among 
unemployed i.e. more Finish than Danish unemployed prefer tighter rules. 
 
Not only the business cycle but also the strong Danish supply side discourse makes this 
country difference unexpected. One could have expected the supply side rhetoric to put 
more and more blame on the unemployed and thereby according to the deservingness 
discussion undermine public sympathy for unemployed (on the British case it has actually 
been studied how the ‘new language’ of the ‘new left’ lead to so-called policy closure, 
Fairclough, 2000). However, such a self-perpetuating feedback mechanism is probably 
equalized and even overruled by the effect that harsher policy actually satisfies the public 
call for control, which we believe is the explanation of the relative low share in favour of 
further control in Denmark in 1999. In order to substantiate this reasoning we need time 
series. As always these are hard to find in social science but based on election data from 
Denmark it is possible to establish time series on perception of misuse of unemployment 
benefits.   
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Table 3: Changes in Danish public perception of misuse of unemployment benefits and 
social assistance. Percentage fully agree and percentage difference (fully or partly agree 
minus fully or partly disagree).  
Survey year:      1973 1975 1977 1979 1990 1994 1998 2001 
Statement:  
´Many receive social transfers without needing them’ 
  Share that fully 
agrees 
     70 49 36 42 31 33 27 27 
  Per cent difference      +81 +54 +41 +44 +40 +43 +38 +31 
Statement: 
 ‘Many of those unemployed do in reality not want to take a job’. 
  Share that fully 
agrees 
          26 20 18 
  Per cent difference           +13 +5 +1 
Sources: Danish election data, partly taken from Goul Andersen fortcoming).  
 
The two available Danish indicators show the same pattern. The indicator ‘many receive 
social transfers without needing them’ is more general than the issue of unemployed and 
do to some extent invite to a political responds but we believe it partly ‘taps’ public 
perception of misuse among unemployed. The time series goes back to 1973 but if 
concentrate on the period from the first Danish labour market reform in 1994 to 2000 we 
see decrease in the share that fully agree from 33 per cent to 27 per cent.2 Using the share 
that partly or fully agree in the posed statement minus the share partly or fully disagree - 
the so-called opinion balance - the development becomes a bit more clear as we see a 
decrease from +43 to +31. 
 
For this limited period we also have another indicator - ‘many of those unemployed do in 
reality not want to take a job’ – that more specifically measure public perception of misuse 
among unemployed. In the period from 1994 to 2001 the share fully agree has decreased 
from 26 per cent to 18 per cent and the opinion balance was decreased from +13 to +1 
even though the supply side discussion in the same period has been intense and the number 
of jobs have increased considerable (OECD standardised unemployment decreased from 
9.6 in 1993 to 4.5 in 2002). The most obvious explanation is that the public responded 
positively or believed in the harsher policy pursued by the Social democratic lead 
government.3  
 
The overall conclusion on the control issue is that a clear majority of the public is in favour 
of tighter control. Combined with the theory of deservingness criteria and the possible 
influence of elite supply side discourse this could be seen as unique political opportunity to 
pursue a real workfare policy even in Nordic countries and the policy development in 
Denmark since 1999 could actually point in such direction. On the other hand this section 
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has shown that the pursued policy in Denmark actually ‘mitigated’ public opinion. 
Furthermore, control policy can still be seen as a plus-sum game as the ‘real’ unemployed 
is believed not to be affected. The real acid test of public support for workfare policy is the 
readiness to reduce the benefit levels.  
 
Public attitude to lower unemployment benefits and social assistance 
 
As described in the introduction the level of unemployment benefits and social assistance 
was actually reduced in Sweden and Finland during the 1990s, whereas Norway and 
Denmark with some exceptions maintained the level in the 1990s. The question is how the 
Scandinavian public responded to such policies where it is difficult to argue that the 
unemployed will not be worse off. 
 
From the International Social Survey Program we have a comparative indicator on public 
attitude towards reduced public spending on unemployment benefit. In the role of 
government module from 1996 respondents were asked whether they would like to see 
more, the same or less government spending on unemployment benefits (see table 4, 
unfortunately Finland is not covered by the survey4). Measured on the opinion balance – 
those who would like to spend more minus those who would like to spend less – the 
Scandinavians do not, at least at first sight, distinguish themselves as one group. Compared 
to the other countries the Swedes seem very much in favour of increased public spending – 
only surpassed by the Spanish that by comparative standards has an undeveloped social 
security system. The Swedish attitude is probably a response to the reduction of benefits 
levels from 90 to 80 per cent of previous earnings in 1993 and the further reduction to 75 
per cent in 1996 - the same year the ISSP survey was conducted.  
 
 
 14 
Table 4: Public attitude to government spending on unemployment benefits in selected 
countries covered by the ISSP 1996 role of government module. Denmark 1998 election 
data. Percentage (don’t know excluded) and percentage difference (spend more minus 
spend less).   
 More The same Less PDI 
Norway 20 61 19 +1 
Sweden 43 42 15 +28 
Denmark 12 68 20 -8 
     
Spain 54 37 10 +44 
Italy 49 30 21 +28 
Great Britian 36 44 20 +16 
Germany (west) 29 53 18 +11 
USA 28 50 22 +6 
France 21 46 33 -12 
Canada 17 53 31 -14 
Australia 12 48 40 -28 
New Zealand 10 42 47 -37 
Source: ISSP 1996: ‘Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each 
area’ ‘unemployment benefits’. Representative population samples N typically 1100. 
 
 
Measured by the opinion balance the Norwegians and Danes do not seem especially keen 
on social protection. However, Norway and Denmark with respectively 61 and 68 per cent 
have the largest share in favour of maintaining government spending at the present level. 
Measured by the share that would like to reduce spending the Scandinavians are below 
average even though unemployment benefits still are rather generous and easy accessible 
by international standards. Thus, the figures on government spending on unemployment 
duplicate the general finding (e.g. measured on overall questions such as ‘has welfare 
reforms gone too far’) that Scandinavians during the lean 1990s changed preferences from 
welfare expansion to welfare maintenance (e.g. Goul Andersen et al. 1999, Forma 
1999:53). So when it comes to reduction of unemployment benefits politicians actually 
face a remarkable conservative public opinion.5  
 
Therefore Nordic politicians actually needed to establish blame avoidance mechanisms if 
unemployment level was to be lowered. Or in more positive terms politicians were forced 
to come up with rather good explanations if real retrenchment should take place. The most 
obvious, and partly also correct, explanation given by Nordic politicians have been that 
reduction was not a matter of politics but a matter of economic necessity. The sudden 
economic crises in Sweden and Finland made, as already mentioned, such an explanation 
credible and the pursued policy that reduced all social benefits made it clear that cuts in 
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unemployment benefits were not a shift towards a new ‘market or incentive strategy’ in 
labour market policy. In contrast a number of labour market specific changes that point in 
direction of a market strategy was implemented in Denmark e.g. reduction of 
unemployment period from around 9 years to 4 years, halving of benefits of unemployed 
below 25 without education and reduced benefits to refugees. One could argue that the 
persistent economic problems found in Denmark compared to the ‘shocks’ of the other 
Nordic countries could have paved for a less conservative electorate in Denmark. 
 
However, measured on the question of less government spending on unemployment 
benefits in table 4 the Danish public do not differ from the other Nordic countries and time 
series based on the Danish election surveys actually show that public resistance to 
reduction in unemployment benefits as well as social assistance was stable through out the 
1990s.6 Nevertheless, these government-spending indicators are a rather indirect method to 
measure the public perception of a market strategy. Therefore the Danish 1994 election 
survey asked the public more directly about the expected effects and their attitude to 
different labour market strategies (see table 5). Unfortunately we are not able to establish 
time series on these indicators but we can compare the public perception of competing 
labour market strategies. Furthermore, 1994 is rather interesting year because 
unemployment at that time had increased since 1987 and culminated at a level of 9.6 in 
1993 (OECD standardised) i.e. it seem to be the perfect time for explaining the Danes the 
necessity of a market strategy.  
 
 
Table 5: Public attitude to different policies to reduce unemployment and perception of 
effectiveness in Denmark 1994. Percentage and percentage difference. 
  The anticipated effect of proposal Good or bad proposal 
  Large limited no Don’t 
know 
PDI1 Good Bad Don’t 
know 
PDI2 
‘Market proposals’:          
 Lower unemployment benefit after 1 
year 
19 31 40 10 -21 24 64 12 -40 
 Reduced access for young to 
unemployment benefits 
17 30 38 15 -21 23 59 18 -36 
 Lower wages for young in start period 29 32 28 11 +2 39 47 14 -8 
Selected other proposals:          
 Job sharing (dustman arrangement) 62 27 6 5 +56 83 10 7 +73 
 Citizen wage 39 22 27 12 +12 40 46 14 -6 
 Education and courses 30 33 29 8 +1 57 32 11 +25 
1No effect minus large effect. 
2Bad proposal minus good proposal 
Source: Goul Andersen 1995:33  
 16 
The general finding as reported by Goul Andersen (1995) is a clear discrepancy between 
the public opinion and the ideas among policy makers. The Danish public in 1994 was 
sceptic about the ‘market proposals’ and a clear majority was against them. 40 per cent 
answered that lowering of unemployment after 1 year – a proposal again and again put 
forward by the Danish Economic Council – would have no effect, 31 per cent answered 
limited effect and only 19 per cent believed in a large effect. If the share anticipating a 
large effect is subtracted from the share that anticipate no effect we arrive at an opinion 
balance at –21. The same is true for reduced access for young to unemployment benefits (-
21) whereas lower wages for young in the first period of a job is anticipated to have a 
larger effect (+2). The survey also showed that the Danish public was clearly against such 
market proposals. Only 24 per cent and 23 per cent found respectively lowering of 
unemployment benefits after one year and reduced access for young to be a good idea. 
 
According to public opinion the most effective proposal to reduce unemployment was job 
sharing – in Denmark labelled dustman arrangement. The proposed idea that was 
implemented among Danish dustman in one of the larger cities was that three persons 
reduced their working hours (and their wage) in order to hire a fourth dustman. 62 per cent 
of the public anticipated this job sharing mechanism to have a large effect whereas only 5 
per cent expected no effect. At the same time a huge majority, 83 per cent, was in favour of 
such a proposal. The respondents were also rather optimistic about the effect (+12) from a 
citizen wage, i.e. an universal flat rate benefit that would allow people to opt out of the 
labour market whenever they wanted, even though the public did not like the proposal so 
much (-6, but still above the ‘market proposals’). 
 
The results are remarkable as these job share strategies among policy makers both on the 
left and right side were believed not to reduce unemployment at all or in the long run even 
to increase unemployment. I.e. the new supply side understanding of unemployment 
among policy makers did actually not seem to influence the public opinion. The alternative 
‘increase qualification strategy’ instead of lowering wages was more acceptable (PDI +25 
on the proposal of education and courses) to the public but the believe in positive effects 
was not overwhelming; 29 per cent expected no effect, 33 per cent expected limited effect 
and 30 per cent expected large effect. 
 
The overall conclusion is that not even in Denmark did the public adopt the idea of a trade-
off between employment and equality that could legitimise reduction of unemployment 
benefits and social assistance. Thus, we do not know how the public would react if 
politicians and other policy makers managed to ‘explain’ such a trade-off to the public. As 
a small experiment we tried to confront respondents in the surveys conducted in Finland 
and Denmark in 1999 with such a trade-off. It is far from straightforward to find a good 
 17 
question but we asked the respondents to use a scale from 0, meaning one primarily should 
emphasise to get everybody into work, to 10, meaning that one primarily should emphasise 
to secure the economic well being of unemployed (see table 6).7 
 
 
Table 6: Public attitudes in the trade-off between an ‘active’ and ‘passive’ labour market 
policy on a. Percentage and average on scale from 0 to 10. Respectively ‘get all 
unemployed in jobs’ and ‘secure economic well being for all unemployed’.  
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average N 
Denmark              
 Population (18-66 
years) 
8 2 7 9 9 30 6 11 10 2 6 5.0 4045 
 Employed  8 2 6 9 8 31 7 11 11 2 7 5.1 1405 
 Long term 
unemployed  
7 1 4 5 4 31 5 8 15 3 17 6.0 460 
 Non insured 7 0 7 4 1 32 4 4 14 3 24 6.2 72 
Finland              
 Population (18-66 
years) 
18 14 15 12 8 12 5 4 6 3 6 3.4 1673 
 Employed  21 14 16 12 8 11 4 3 5 2 4 3.1 1069 
 Long term 
unemployed  
10 8 7 9 3 19 7 7 10 5 14 5.2 815 
 Non insured 10 11 10 10 3 17 7 6 8 5 13 4.8 286 
 
 
The logic of the question is to weight the aim of ‘passive policy’ i.e. secure economic well 
being against the aim of ‘active policy’ to get all unemployment into jobs under the 
assumption of a trade-off and the other way around.8 Again we have no time series but we 
can compare the two countries and attitudes among different groups. In the Danish 
population 30 per cent place themselves in category 5 on the scale, which could be 
interpreted as equal importance should be given to the two goals. This could also be the 
interpretation of the overall situation in Denmark as the average of the given answers is 
5.0. With an average of 3.4 the Finish population to a larger extent than the Danish 
population emphasise the aim of getting everybody into jobs. The 18 per cent Finns that 
place themselves in category zero could be seen as those who in a given situation are 
willing to sacrifice economic well being for job growth. This interpretation is supported by 
the fact that both in Denmark and Finland we find a clear left-right wing divide on this 
question. 
 
The unemployed themselves seem less in favour of sacrificing economic well being for 
jobs than employed. The averages are respectively 6.0 among Danish long-term 
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unemployed compared to 5.1 among employed and 5.2 among Finish unemployed 
compared to 3.1 among unemployed. This fit nicely with the finding that according to the 
Nordic unemployed themselves economic insecurity is seen as the largest social problem 
connected to unemployment and economic insecurity is the best predictor of general well 
being (e.g. Goul Andersen, 2002a, Nordenmark & Strandh, 1999). 
 
Conclusion 
 
With point of departure in the literature on ‘the new politics of the welfare state’ the aim of 
this article was to open the ‘black box’ of public attitudes in relation to the intensified 
‘active’ labour market policy pursued in the Nordic countries during the 1990s. As the 
Nordic public in general is in favour of the welfare state one could predict a 
straightforward ‘new politics conflict’ i.e. at the one side the policy elite taking ‘necessary’ 
decisions and at the other side the reluctant voters. The counter thesis was that the public 
would be in favour of harsher policy because: 1) It is well known that the positive attitude 
towards the welfare state is not automatically transferred into support for specific welfare 
state schemes. Especially not support for unemployment benefits and social assistance. 2) 
One could suggest that the ‘new’ supply side explanations that especially gained influence 
among Danish policy makers could reinforce the public perception of unemployed as not 
deserving. 3) Policy makers have again and again emphasised that the increased use of 
‘stick’ is followed by new ‘carrots, which in combination turn into a plus-sum game. 
 
When it comes to activation the political scene is definitely more set for credit claming 
than blame avoidance. Even though the public (rightly) has been sceptical about the 
employment effect of these policy measures the Danish and Finish surveys showed that 
that the general public but also the unemployed themselves perceive these initiatives as an 
advantage. In more general terms the Nordic public seems to accept the idea of intensified 
‘active’ policy as a plus-sum game. To some extent the same hold for increased control. In 
Denmark and Finland only a small minority of both employed and unemployed indicated 
that control should be loosened but the unemployed were much less in favour of tighter 
control than the general population. 
 
However, this political potential for ‘credit-claming’ cannot be seen as a road to a real 
workfare strategy. In the case of tighter control we found a clear country difference 
between Finland and Denmark, which we explain as a feedback from harsher Danish 
policy that mitigates public opinion. This interpretation was substantiated by time series 
that showed that the perception of misuse with unemployment benefits during the 1990s 
was reduced in Denmark. This limited potential for ‘credit claming’ becomes crystal clear 
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when we turn the question of lowering benefits. On this issue the Scandinavian public 
distinguished themselves as the most conservative among western countries. 
 
Not even in Denmark where unemployment had been high and persistent was the public 
open to a ‘market strategy’. On the contrary, additional questions in the Danish 1994 
election survey showed that the public found job sharing arrangements both more effective 
and desirable. Thus, the Danish public had not even adopted the idea that there is a trade-
off between equality and employment. If the public is confronted with such a trade-off the 
surveys conducted in Denmark and Finland shows a possible future divide between the 
population and the unemployed, the former being more willing to sacrifice economic well 
being for jobs, but such a forecast is highly speculative. At the moment the Nordic 
economies show good performance and the lesson from the lean 1990s seem to be that 
even in hard times the Nordic public avoid blaming the unemployed and stick to solidarity.  
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Notes 
                                               
1 For a presentation of the data and the subsamples please see 
http://www.socsci.auc.dk/ccws/projects/BChangingLabourMarkets/b2.htm.  In order to obtain the larger 
picture we supplement with other data sources. 
2 Compared to 1973, where 70 per cent ‘fully agreed’ in the statement, the reduction in public perception of 
misuse seems tremendously strong but in Danish political history 1973 must be perceived as a deviant year. 
3 The same development is found in Sweden (Svallfors 1999) but in this case changed public opinion of 
misuse has probably more to do with worsened labour market situation than pursued policy.  
4 But we know from national Finish surveys that that opinion balance has been in favour of increasing public 
spending on unemployment benefits expect in 1995 (Forma 1999: 51). 
5 So do politicians in Spain, Italy, Great Britain, Germany and apparently even USA according to the ISSP 
1996. By contrast the public of New Zealand and Australia seem much more in favour of reduction. Such 
differences might partly be explained by the institutional set up of the unemployment benefits systems as 
means testing, which is extreme in Australia and New Zealand as they do not have an insurance based 
scheme at all, is believed to create a more negative image of unemployed (e.g. Rothstein 1998:157). 
6 Percentage differences (spend more minus spend less) were respectively for unemployment benefits and 
social assistance 1990: +2/-11, 1994: 0/-11, 1998: -7/-19, 2000: +5/-8 and 2001 –1/-13. In contrast to a 
survey from 1985 that showed a clear majority in favour of spending more. Probably – like in Sweden in the 
ISSP 1996 survey – a public response to the general reduction that in Denmark was undertaken by the 
bourgeois in 1982.   
7 The wording was a bit different in Denmark and Finland. The former had longer introduction. Danes were 
asked ‘Even though both can be important it is still a question what to emphasise in policy towards 
unemployed. If you imagine a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means that one primarily should emphasise to get 
everybody into work whereas 10 means that one primarily should emphasise to secure the economic well 
being of unemployed where would you place yourselves?’. Fines were asked more directly;  ‘In a scale 0 to 
10 what do you think should be the most important aim of labour market policy, ensuring jobs for all 
unemployed or securing economic well being for unemployed’. 
8 High economic security will diminish the possibility to get unemployed into the labour market due to low 
economic incentives and high labour costs that grow out low wage jobs (for a critic on the Danish and Finish 
case see Goul Andersen & Albrekt Larsen forthcoming). 
 
 
 
 
  
